Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music by Falstrom, Carl A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 45 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-1994
Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v.
Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital
Sound Sampling in Popular Music
Carl A. Falstrom
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carl A. Falstrom, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in
Popular Music, 45 Hastings L.J. 359 (1994).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol45/iss2/4
Thou Shalt Not Steal:
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Digital sound sampling,1 the borrowing2 of parts of sound record-
ings and the subsequent incorporations of those parts into a new re-
cording,3 continues to be a source of controversy in the law.4 Part of
* J.D. Candidate, 1994; B.A. University of Chicago, 1990. The people whom I wish
to thank may be divided into four groups: (1) My family, for reasons that go unstated; (2)
My friends and cohorts at WHPK-FM, Chicago, from 1986 to 1990, with whom I had more
fun and learned more things about music and life than a person has a right to; (3) Those
who edited and shaped this Note, without whom it would have looked a whole lot worse in
print; and (4) Especially special persons-Robert Adam Smith, who, among other things,
introduced me to rap music and inspired and nurtured my appreciation of it; and Leah
Goldberg, who not only put up with a whole ton of stuff for my three years of law school,
but who also managed to radiate love, understanding, and support during that trying time.
1. Digital sound sampling has been described by one musicologist as "the conversion
of analog sound waves into a digital code.... [This code] can then be reused, manipulated
or combined with other digitalized or recorded sounds using a machine... [like a] comput-
erized synthesizer." Judith Greenberg Finell, How a Musicologist Views Digital Sampling
Issues, N.Y. LU., May 22, 1992, at 5, 7 n.3.
2. "Borrowed" is a loaded term. Many are more apt to equate sampling with theft
than with borrowing. Nevertheless, "borrowing" seems to have caught on as a convenient,
easily conceptualized shorthand reference to the idea that samplers take sound from a
source and put it into their own recordings. Furthermore, "borrowing" connotes the com-
monly acknowledged reality that, in a sense, every music composition "borrows" from
every composition that preceded it, without pejorative references to the subsequent com-
position as "theft" or "piracy." I therefore use the term to convey both asportation and
homage.
3. See Bruce J. McGiverin, Note, Digital Sound Sampling, Copyright and Publicity:
Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87 COLuM. L. Rev. 1723, 1724
(1987). For discussions of the creation of a digital sound sample that are beyond the scope
of this Note, see James P. Allen, Jr., Look What They've Done to My Song Ma-Digital
Sampling in the 90's: A Legal Challenge for the Music Industry, 9 U. Miami ENr. &
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the controversy stems from a lack of legal standards against which to
assess its legitimacy. Because music sampling is such a recent phe-
nomenon,5 Congress did not address the practice in the Copyright Act
of 1976 and has not addressed it in amendments to the Act.6 Thus far,
SPORTS L. REv. 179, 181-82 (1992); Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright
Law and the American Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad "Rap"?, 37 Loy. L. REv. 879,
880-82 (1992); Molly McGraw, Sound Sampling Protection and Infringement in Today's
Music Industry, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 147, 148-51 (1989); Mark G. Quail, Digital Samplers:
Can Copyright Protect Music from the Numbers Game?, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 39, 42-43
(1993); Thomas D. Arn, Comment, Digital Sampling and Signature Sound: Protection
Under Copyright and Non-Copyright Law, 6 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 61, 64-66
(1989); Tamara J. Byram, Note, Digital Sound Sampling and a Federal Right of Publicity: Is
It Live or Is It Macintosh?, 10 COMPuTER/L.J. 365, 370-71 (1990); Maura Giannini, Note,
The Substantial Similarity Test and Its Use in Determining Copyright Infringement Through
Digital Sampling, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 509, 510-12 (1990); Thomas C.
Moglovkin, Note, Original Digital. No More Free Samples, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 135, 137-40
(1990); David Small, Comment, To Catch a Thief. Unauthorized Digital Sampling of Copy-
righted Musical Works, 17 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 85-87 (1991); Ronald Mark Wells,
Comment, You Can't Always Get What You Want But Digital Sampling Can Get What You
Need!, 22 AKRON L. REV. 691, 699-700 (1989).
4. By 1986 digital sampling had been around long enough to "[begin] to change the
way music is made." Jon Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
1986, at C23. Numerous hit recordings had used the new technology, including Yes's
"Owner of a Lonely Heart" and Stevie Wonder's "Part-Time Lover," and sampled artists
could already be heard to complain-including (somewhat ironically) Yes's lead singer,
Chris Squire. Id.
5. One of the first music sampling machines to become widely available was the
Fairlight C.M.I., introduced in 1979 with a price of $28,000. Gregory Albright, Digital
Sound Sampling and the Copyright Act of 1976: Are Isolated Sounds Protected?, 38 Copy-
RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 47, 52 (1992). The first relatively inexpensive sampler (priced
under $1,700) appeared in 1985. McGraw, supra note 3, at 149.
6. Federal statutory copyright law is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Major amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act include the Computer Software
Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 10, 101, 117, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980); the
Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (1984); the Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984); the Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); the
Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988); the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990); the Architectural
Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990); the Computer
Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5134 (1990); and
the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992).
An interesting argument has been advanced that when a sampler makes an intermedi-
ate copy-that is, copies from a source, manipulates the sample, then incorporates the
sample into her own work-the sampler per se violates the Copyright Act. See William
Sloan Coats & David Harrison Kramer, Not As Clean As They Wanna Be: Intermediate
Copying in Acuff-Rose v. Campbell, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 1994).
According to Coats and Kramer, when a sample is made, one can presume that an interme-
diate copy is the means by which the source is transformed into the final, manipulated
product. This intermediate copy, the authors argue, is itself an infringement of rights. See
17 U.S.C. § 114 (1988). Whether this argument would be accepted by a court, however,
remains to be seen.
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there are no legislative criteria governing sampling. Furthermore, dis-
putes involving music samplers have largely remained out of the
courts;7 as a result, no judicial standards have been established.
On December 17, 1991, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York decided the first music sampling case
to proceed through trial, Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros.
Records, Inc.8 In Grand Upright Music, plaintiff was the copyright
owner of the song "Alone Again (Naturally)," made famous in a 1972
recording by singer-songwriter Raymond "Gilbert" O'Sullivan. Plain-
tiff brought suit to enjoin the "improper and unlicensed" use of the
song by rap artist Biz Markie in "Alone Again," a track appearing on
the artist's album I Need a Haircut.9 In the song, Biz used a digital
sample of ten seconds of music from "Alone Again (Naturally)."1 In
a terse four-page opinion, United States District Court Judge Kevin
Thomas Duffy granted the injunction and referred the defendants-
Biz, his publisher, his producers, and his record label, among other
entities-to the United States Attorney for possible criminal
prosecution."
7. In the absence of guidelines, two ways of dealing with the legal ramifications of
using samples are available to the sampler. First, the sampler may compile a list of all
sampled works, determine the owner of the copyright for each work, and negotiate permis-
sion to use it. See Note, A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Pay, 105 HARV.
L. REv. 726, 727-28 (1992). This method has become standard operating procedure at
many record companies. Id. Because this process is often slow and expensive, the record
sometimes spends months before release in a legal limbo which has been dubbed "sample
hell." Havelock Nelson, Dissed by Pirates, Dogged by "Sample Hell," a Maturing Art Form
Fights for Respect, BILLBOARD, Nov. 28, 1992, at R3, R24.
Second, the sampler may be able to get away with releasing an album with uncleared
samples, gambling either that the owner of the copyright of the sampled work will find it
too bothersome or unprofitable to sue, or that the uncleared samples will not come to the
attention of the copyright owner. Richard Harrington, The Groove Robbers' Judgment:
Order on "Sampling" Songs May Be Rap Landmark, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 1991, at D1,
D7. One expert opined that this route might be chosen in as many as 50% of the cases. Id.
at D7. If the sampler chooses the second option and a suit follows, the sampler may settle
with the copyright owner, in effect admitting guilt. See Jason H. Marcus, Note, Don't Stop
That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of Digital Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS Comm.
& Et'r. LJ. 767,782-83 (1991) (discussing two of the more well-known suits and noting the
rapidity of settlement).
While many of the well-known suits involve the sampled artists themselves, see id., the
threat of a lawsuit comes not just from sampled artists. For example, one publishing house,
EMI Music Publishing, employs six people solely to listen to newly-released records, in an
attempt to find unauthorized samples of its copyrighted songs so that it can pressure the
artists and record companies to pay for their use. John Leland, The Moper vs. The Rapper,
NnwsWnEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 55.
8. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
9. Id. at 183.
10. Id.
11. Id at 185.
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Both the legal and the performing arts communities eagerly
awaited the outcome of this case.12 Much was at stake. On one side,
sampled artists stood ready to assert their rights to protect their
works; the vitality of rap music would be threatened by an adverse
decision. On the other, samplers looked forward to practicing their
craft without being haunted by the specter of litigation; they antici-
pated "open season" on artists' back catalogs. Even if neither of these
extremes was a likely result, at least the court had an opportunity to
provide much-needed guidance to samplers and the lawyers who rep-
resent them. Unfortunately, the comparatively unique facts of the
case, combined with the court's apparent disinclination to discuss ap-
plicable standards of law or to provide guidance for parties in future
lawsuits, rendered the potentially landmark decision of little value
either as precedent or advice.
Part I of this Note discusses the facts of Grand Upright Music.
Part II critiques the text of the case itself and discusses some of the
ruling's aftereffects. Part III argues that the court failed to realize the
significance of the issues at hand and, in doing so, missed an opportu-
nity to provide sorely needed legal guidance in the area of digital sam-
pling. Finally, Part IV proposes a possible solution to the issues
presented by digital sampling, with an eye toward protecting the rights
of both the sampled artists and the samplers.
1. The Case
Biz Markie recorded "Alone Again" in March 1991.13 The musi-
cal portion of the song consists of a digital sample of the first eight
bars of Gilbert O'Sullivan's "Alone Again (Naturally)," comprising
about ten seconds of music.14 This sample is continually looped so
that the same ten seconds of music are heard over and over for the
length of the song.15 Biz raps over this background, repeating varia-
tions of the titular phrase as a chorus.16 Completing the track is a
simple drum beat. 17
In July 1991, after the recording of the song but before its release,
Biz's attorney forwarded a cassette recording of "Alone Again" to
Terry O'Sullivan, Gilbert's brother and representative of Gilbert's
American interests, seeking permission to use the sample.18 On Au-
12. See Robert G. Sugarman & Joseph P. Salvo, Sampling Litigation in the Limelight,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 1, 5.
13. Id. at 1.
14. Harrington, supra note 7, at D7.
15. Id.
16. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 5.




gust 27, 1991, however, before Terry could respond, Warner Brothers
Records released I Need a Haircut.19
Terry O'Sullivan then wrote a letter to Biz's attorney, Theodore
Weis, demanding that "Alone Again" be deleted from the album or,
in the alternative, that the album itself be withdrawn from distribu-
tion.20 According to Terry, Weis called him after receiving the letter
to explain that Biz had made the decision to release the album against
Weis's advice.2' Weis subsequently sent Terry a letter, dated October
27, 1991,22 that expressed his client's "'[sincere] regrets that the new
composition was released' without permission." The letter asserted,
however, that Terry had "implied that consent 'would be obtained for
an agreed price,"' and "[i]f he would have told [Biz] to refrain from
using samples of the original composition.., he would have heeded
[the] request." 2 Following unsuccessful attempts to have the album
removed from the market, Terry brought suit.24
Each side saw the case in equally stark terms. "'At the end of this
case... O'Sullivan will be singing that song all over again,"' averred
attorney Robert W. Cinque, retained to represent Biz and his fellow
defendants at trial.25 Cinque indicated that the defense would be
based on an incomplete chain of title argument regarding the
copyright.26
On the other side, Terry O'Sullivan "warned [Biz] that he should
not be optimistic." 27 Joseph D. "Jody" Pope, representing Terry and
Gilbert O'Sullivan, noted that a dispute over the rights to the song
had arisen before and had been resolved in Gilbert's favor, when a
British court ordered Gilbert's former manager to give the publishing
and master recording rights back to him.28 This made the infringe-
19. See Larry Flick, Seger, Metallica, Williams Offer More Heat in August, BILL-
BOARD, Aug. 3, 1991, at 5. Critical appraisals of the record were often unforgiving: "tame,
low-impact .... rhythmically slack and mush-mouthed," Album Reviews, BILLBOARD,
Sept. 14, 1991, at 86; "[contains] nothing really as catchy ... [as anything] from his last
album," Gil Griffin, The Latest Moves From Rap's Lightest, WASH. Posr, Aug. 23, 1991,
Weekend, at N16, N19; "after a while his one-dimensional thumping-as-music and five-
minute listing of friends becomes dull," James Muretich, Recent Releases, CALGARY HER-
ALD, Sept. 8, 1991, at B7. Despite its naysayers, however, the album reached Number 51
on Billboard magazine's Top Rhythm and Blues Albums chart. Top R&B Albums, BILL-
BOARD, Sept. 28, 1991, at 32.
20. James Barron, Composer, Who Knows He's Heard That Song Before, Sues, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1991, at B3; Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 1.
21. Barron, supra note 20, at B3.
22. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 5.
23. Barron, supra note 20, at B3.
24. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 5.
25. Barron, supra note 20, at B3.
26. Id.
27. Harrington, supra note 7, at D7.
28. Id.
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ment by Biz particularly galling to the O'Sullivans.29 According to
Pope, "[The issue is] dirt simple .... You can't use somebody else's
property without their consent .... [Sampling] is a euphemism ... for
what anybody else would call pickpocketing. ''30
H. The Court's Decision
A. Itself
Michael F. Sukin, co-counsel for the O'Sullivans, correctly char-
acterized the court's resolution of the dispute as "a rout of the defend-
ants and a complete vindication of O'Sullivan's position."'31 The court
appeared to accept every argument the plaintiffs made and reject
every defense the defendants submitted. A close look at the opinion
reveals how the court arrived at the decision.
Its first four words-"Thou shalt not steal"-contain the opin-
ion's first and only reference to any authority or precedent.32 To the
court, sampling equaled theft. Since Biz had already admitted to us-
ing the sample, the only issue remaining was who owned the copyright
to the composition and the master recording.33 Three categories of
evidence satisfied the court that plaintiff's claim of ownership was
valid: certificates of copyright and deeds that transferred its title to
plaintiff; testimony from Gilbert O'Sullivan himself regarding his au-
thorship and performance; and letters from defendants to the
O'Sullivans requesting permission to use the sample.34
Defendants challenged the admission of the first category of evi-
dence. A challenge to the admission of the certificate of copyright, on
the grounds that it had not been "authenticated," 35 was rejected by
the court. In rejecting the challenge, the court strongly hinted that it
was frivolous.36 Efforts to contest the introduction of the transfer of
title documents were also fruitless. 37
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Michael F. Sukin, Rappers Shouldn't Bash Tictor in Sampling Suit: O'Sullivan
Was Only Defending His Rights, BILLBOARD, June 6, 1992, at 6.
32. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 &
183 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Exodus 20:15, the Seventh of the Ten Commandments).
33. Id. at 183.
34. Id. at 183-84.
35. See FED. R. EvID. 902.
36. The court opined that defendants' counsel never really "[believed] that the certifi-
cate was anything less than a true and complete copy of the public record." Grand Upright
Music, 780 F. Supp. at 184.
37. The court characterized one ground of the defendants' challenge as surprise based
on inadequate (and inexcusable) preparation, and another as reliance on an incorrect in-
terpretation of the law. Id.
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Regarding the second category of evidence, the court relied on
Gilbert O'Sullivan's testimony that Grand Upright Music owned the
copyright. The court noted that "[t]here can be no one more inter-
ested in the... copyright than a person in Gilbert O'Sullivan's posi-
tion, '38 and as such he was "thoroughly credible and believable. '39 In
addition, not only did defendants' counsel fail to dispute Gilbert's tes-
timony, but he also evidently concentrated his cross-examination on
the legally irrelevant issue of Gilbert's motive for refusing to license
the use of his song.40
The court found the third category of evidence most dispositive.
The very act of requesting permission to use the sample, the court
stated, evidenced defendants' belief that plaintiff held the copyright:
"One would not agree to pay to use the material of another unless
there was a valid copyright! What more persuasive evidence can there
be!"'41 The court said that obtaining the license was "necessary" and
an "obligation" and inferred from defendants' conduct that they were
knowingly breaking the law and trampling other people's rights in an
effort "to sell thousands upon thousands of records."42 It was this
"callous disregard for the law" 43 that moved the court to refer the
matter to the United States Attorney for possible criminal
prosecution."
In response to defendants' argument that digital sampling was a
widespread practice in rap music, the court said that attempts to ex-
cuse lawlessness by noting a common disregard for the law are always
destined for abject failure-the argument was "totally specious ....
[Its] mere statement... [was] its own refutation."45 Thus, the court
granted the injunction.46
Counsel for Biz vowed to appeal the decision,47 but two weeks
later a settlement was announced. 48 Although its terms were confi-
dential, 49 the settlement reportedly included a "substantial" cash pay-
38. Id. Presumably, this was because O'Sullivan wrote the lyrics and melody of the




42. Id. at 185.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7 (regarding the lack of legislation or judicial
sampling "law").
44. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
45. Id. at 185 n.2.
46. Id. at 185.
47. Ronald Sullivan, Judge Rules Against Rapper in "Sampling" Case, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 17, 1991, at B2.
48. Barry Layne, Warner Bros. Settles Biz Copyright Case, BPI Entertainment News
Wire, Dec. 31, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BPI File.
49. Id.
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ment.50 Warner Brothers Records took out an "unprecedented" ad in
Billboard magazine, urging retailers to return any and all of some
200,000 shipped copies of I Need a Haircut that had not yet been
sold.51 Subsequent pressings of the album, reportedly according to
the terms of the settlement, have had the track "Alone Again" de-
leted.52 In short, the result was a total victory for Gilbert and Terry
O'Sullivan.
B. Analysis
To a certain extent both the plaintiffs' success and the vitriolic
nature of the court's decision were predictable and understandable.
From the sampler's perspective, the case exemplifies how not to sam-
ple.5 3 Throughout the affair, a number of questionable moves were
made by Biz, his record label, and his counsel.
First, Warner Brothers, for some unknown reason, released the
album after asking for Terry's permission, but before receiving his re-
ply. This bizarre act supported an inference that the label was inter-
ested in a quick profit and belied any claim of good faith that the label
might have made.54 Warner Brothers certainly could have avoided
the entire mess by bargaining with Terry for the rights, and might have
avoided a claim by not contacting the O'Sullivans at all.55 The reason-
ing of the decision implies that the court might have been more forgiv-
ing-or at least more uncertain about the equities of the case and
therefore more charitable-had Biz simply blindsided the O'Sullivans.
Second, Biz's counsel attempted a defense that was at best unu-
sual and at worst indefensible. Biz's counsel likely was frustrated by
the lack of precedent in the area and felt he had to fashion some
unique tools to help his client. However, the lack of precedent fails to
fully explain the ineffectiveness of the defense. Specifically, the court
was understandably piqued by three facets of the defense: the com-
plete lack of pretrial discovery; the peculiar reliance by counsel on
two erroneous interpretations of the law; and the cross-examination
50. Chuck Philips, Songwriter Wins Large Settlement in Rap Suit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1992, at F1, F12.
51. Id. at F12.
52. Id.
53. For a worthwhile examination of how one might sample, see Whitney C. Brous-
sard, Comment, Current and Suggested Business Practices for the Licensing of Digital Sam-
ples, 11 Loy. ENr. L.J. 479, 480-502 (1991). Members of the industry were hardly
charitable to Biz and his attorneys in characterizing their performance. See, e.g., Steve
Hochman, Judge Raps Practice of "Sampling", L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at F1, F2 ("Biz
did a dumb thing .... ); Fred Shuster, Music Samplers Rethink Options After Ruling,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. 2, 1992, at 30 ("What Markie did was dumb.").
54. See Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 5.
55. See supra note 7.
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attempt to elicit Gilbert's motive for not granting the license.5 6 The
decision teaches attorneys an important, but self-evident lesson-do
not be surprised to lose a case when you appear unprepared and be-
have unprofessionally.
C. Fallout
Reaction in the performing arts community to Grand Upright
Music has taken several forms. One effect of the ruling has been a
noticeably more hostile climate for samplers. This climate was mani-
fested by a renewed round of litigation. Four days before the Grand
Upright Music decision, perhaps in anticipation of an adverse ruling,
dance music producer Jellybean Benitez filed suit over an unauthor-
ized sample.57 Four days after the ruling, Thff City Records, a New
York-based independent label, sued Sony Music Inc. and the Sony-
distributed label Def Jam Records over a drum sample.58 About a
month later, Bridgeport Music, a publishing company, brought suit to
enjoin the manufacture and sale of a hit record containing a sample of
a recording to which it owned the copyright.59 A group calling itself
"The Association of Parliament/Funkadelic Members 1971-83" filed a
massive suit alleging that it owns copyrights to recordings created by
George Clinton that have been sampled by at least sixty-two record-
56. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 184.
57. Jellybean Prods., Inc. v. Atlantic Records Corp., No. 91-8411 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
13, 1991). The complaint states causes of action for copyright infringement and conversion.
Stan Soocher, Sampling Ruling Leaves Questions; Between Rap and a Hard Place, Er. L.
& FIN., Jan. 1992, at 7. Ironically, the same judge who adjudicated Grand Upright Music
was assigned the case. Id.
58. The complaint alleged that producer Marion "Marley Marl" Williams illegally
sampled drums from a 1973 recording by the Honeydrippers called "Impeach the Presi-
dent," and incorporated them into two recordings by rap star LL Cool J-"Around the
Way Girl" and "Six Minutes of Pleasure." Barbara Davies, Tuff City Sues Sony, Def Jam
Over Sample on Cool J Singles, BiLLBOARD, Jan. 11, 1992, at 71. The suit has since settled.
See Melinda Newman & Chris Morris, Sampling Safeguards Follow Suit: Biz Markie Rul-
ing Prompts Labels' Action, BrI.LBOARD, May 23, 1992, at 1, 80.
59. Janine McAdams, New Sampling Suit Targets Terminator X, BILLBOARD, Feb. 15,
1992, at 12, 89. The complaint also sought "'all gains, profits, and advantages derived by
the defendant from the infringing work"' and asked for damages in excess of $500,000. Id.
at 12. The case was dismissed after Bridgeport Music's ownership of the copyright was
questioned. See Janine McAdams, Eric B. & Rakim Sued Over Funkadelic Sample, BILL-
BOARD, Dec. 5, 1992, at 12 [hereinafter McAdams, Eric B. & Rakim].
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ing acts.60 Most recently, Bridgeport Music and label Westbound
Records have sued over the use of a sample.61
Had the court in Grand Upright Music squarely confronted the
issue, much of this subsequent litigation could have been avoided.
Rather than assuming that sampling was copyright infringement from
the beginning, the court should have examined what interests are at
stake when a sampler samples, in order to decide when samples rise to
the level of actual infringement. The decision rendered all unauthor-
ized sampling legally suspect; no distinction seemingly could be made
between small bites and large cuts, between instantly recognizable
"trademarks" and impossibly obscure and mundane banalities. In-
stead the inquiry became cut and dried: Does someone else own the
copyright? If so, then any unlicensed sample is an infringement.
Predictably, the court's overly broad decision in Grand Upright
Music has made sampling a hazardous occupation. Recordings featur-
ing samples must spend more time in limbo while every sample is
cleared. 62 In some cases, rappers have eschewed samples entirely,
preferring to use live musicians rather than suffer the potential conse-
60. See Janine McAdams, Clinton C'rights at Center of Lawsuit: Montes Takes Aim at
Bridgeport, Others, BILLBOARD, Sept. 19, 1992, at 8. The suit alleges, among other things,
fraud and deceit, breach of contract, RICO violations, and 102 counts of copyright in-
fringement. Id.
61. See McAdams, Eric B. & Rakim, supra note 59. A sample from the Funkadelic
song "No Head, No Backstage Pass" allegedly showed up in Eric B. & Rakim's 1988 re-
cording "Lyrics of Fury." Id.
62. An anonymous record company executive tells the story of a group with whom he
worked who wanted to use, as he put it, "three seconds of Billie Holiday and the line 'Toto,
I've got a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore...' Sheila Rule, Record Companies Are
Challenging "Sampling" in Rap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at C13, C18 (quoting from
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's movie The Wizard of Oz). The executive explains that because
of Grand Upright Music:
[W]e had to make sure we had written clearance on everything beforehand. In
every case of obvious sampling, we were able to contact people. But [in the case
of the aforementioned samples], well, people probably wouldn't have noticed.
When we sent the "Oz" sample to people who own the rights, we had to
point out where it was on the record and then they rejected it because they said
the record was too vulgar. The Billie Holiday snippet was so obscure we had to
figure out who the publisher was. It was an arcane procedure and it was impossi-
ble to get anyone to sign off on it, so we had to remove it. Now a record we were
to come out with within two weeks is coming out six weeks later, after a lot of
time, money and legal fees and a lot of problems. And we are like the tip of the
iceberg.
Id. at C18.
Some groups, such as Big Audio Dynamite, have composed unique and valuable music
by incorporating hundreds of samples from wildly diverse sources, creating a virtual aural
collage. It is not hard to see how "sample hell," see supra note 7, could spell the end of
such art.
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quences of an adverse judgment. 63 These difficulties suggest a future
in which the risks of sampling are so great that the technique will vir-
tually perish as an art form.
On the other hand, the facts of Grand Upright Music are such
that subsequent litigants would be hard-pressed to rely on it as prece-
dent. Performers will rarely ask permission to use a sample and then
release the album without authorization to use the sample; in so do-
ing, Biz made it easy for the court to throw the book at him. Further-
more, "Alone Again" did not involve the use of a mere drum beat or
shout lifted from an obscure recording; the sample was instantly rec-
ognizable, and it constituted the entire musical accompaniment to
Biz's rap. Without use of the sample, there would have been no music
at all.64
The significance of Grand Upright Music, however, cannot be de-
nied-a judge in one of the most important trial courts in the federal
system has declared unauthorized sampling to be against the law.
Moreover, as of this date, Grand Upright Music is the only source of
legal standards with regard to sound sampling in existence.65
63. LL Cool J, Hammer, and Naughty by Nature, among other acts, have started to
rely heavily on live musicians. See David Landis & James T. Jones IV, Court Fights Over
Rap Music Sampling, USA TODAY, Jan. 16, 1992, at 2D3; Rule, supra note 62, at C18.
64. Michael Sukin maintains that Gilbert's lawsuit was a principled stand "by a soli-
tary, artistic person who did not like the idea that somebody was using the song that he
wrote and the recording that he made without his permission," not "some megacompany
saying, 'This is my property. Either keep your hands off or pay a big fee."' Sukin, supra
note 31, at 6. Furthermore, in the past, many labels and publishers, fearful of opening a
can of worms, and perhaps mindful of the prevalence of sampling, had been reluctant to
bring suit. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 7, at 781-83. However, even after Grand Upright
Music, the doctrine of "unclean hands" may still be a deterrent. See McGraw, supra note
3, at 168.
65. The second case to confront the issue directly, Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F.
Supp. 282 (D.NJ. 1993), was decided four months later. In this copyright infringement
action, the court held that the issue of whether a sample was a significant portion of the
song sampled was a question of fact and denied the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the claim.
In Jarvis, plaintiff wrote and recorded a song entitled "The Music's Got Me" in 1982.
Id. at 286. Defendants Robert Clivilles and David Cole incorporated samples of plaintiff's
recording into their song "Get Dumb! (Free Your Body)" in 1989, and plaintiff brought
suit for copyright infringement in 1990. Id.
On the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that a triable issue
of fact existed whether defendants' sample of plaintiff's work constituted a sufficiently dis-
tinctive and original expression of an idea (and was therefore covered by plaintiff's copy-
right). Id. at 291-92. The court framed the issue in terms of "whether the defendant
appropriated, either quantitatively or qualitatively, 'constituent elements of the work that
are original,' such that the copying rises to the level of an unlawful appropriation...
[which in turn depends on] the question ... whether the value of the original work is
substantially diminished by the copying." Id. at 291 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
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TM. The Rationale-Some Deconstruction
A. Sampling as Theft
The Grand Upright Music court's assertion that sampling is a
form of theft reflects a widely held belief.66 Most, if not all, opponents
of the practice decry it on the ground that sampling constitutes an
unlawful appropriation of something-be that something the sound
itself or the exclusive right to its use. For the characterization of sam-
pling as theft to prevail, however, a plaintiff must have had a property
interest, and the interest must have been infringed in some way.
67
Perhaps the reason why the court pointed only to the Bible in
condemning sampling as theft is because the legal support for such an
assertion is flimsy. No matter what is asserted as the object of theft,
this Subpart argues that a sampled artist is not necessarily deprived of
anything to which she is legally entitled.
(1) Theft of Sound
One commentator has asserted that digital sampling is just an-
other form of "piracy. '68 This analogy is inaccurate. The pirate gen-
erally duplicates an entire work, such as an album or a motion picture.
The pirate then mass-produces copies and sells them, thereby taking
The Jarvis court's discussion of Grand Upright Music actually contains more legal
groundwork than Grand Upright Music itself. United States District Judge Harold A. Ack-
erman identified the issue in Grand Upright Music, as well as in Jarvis itself, as involving
"fragmented literal similarity," where the similarity between the two works is not compre-
hensive, but results from copying individual elements. Id. at 289 (citing MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER & DAVID NIMMER, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A][2] (1991)). A cause of action
based on fragmented literal similarity "depends on the truth of the principle that 'the value
of a work may be substantially diminished even when only a part of it is copied, if the part
that is copied is of great qualitative importance to the work as a whole."' Id. at 291 (quot-
ing Werlin v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
The court rejected defendant's argument that substantial similarity requires that an
average listener be prone to confuse one work for the other. Id. at 290. However, the
court did not make clear how the value of a work might be diminished if this were not the
case.
66. See, e.g., Small, supra note 3, at 83 (comparing samplers to thieves in title of com-
ment); J.C. Thom, Comment, Digital Sampling: Old-Fashioned Piracy Dressed Up in Sleek
New Technology, 8 Loy. ENT. L.J. 297, 331-36 (1988) (characterizing samplers as thieves);
Wells, supra note 3, at 705 ("Ultimately, digital samplers are thieves.").
67. The Model Penal Code defines criminal theft as the act of "unlawfully [taking], or
[exercising] unlawful control over ... property of another with purpose to deprive" that
person of the property. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 (1962); cf. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER,
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.2 (1989) (listing elements of a copyright infringe-
ment suit as ownership of copyright by plaintiff and copying by defendant).
68. Thom, supra note 66, at 309. Defined broadly, "piracy is the unauthorized dupli-
cation of the sounds on copyrighted records, tapes, cassettes, compact discs, or any other
form of sound storage." Id.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
DIGITAL SOUND SAMPLING
money directly out of the artist's pocket. Samplers, on the other hand,
generally copy small pieces of a work and use them, often combined
with samples from many other works, to create a new cohesive
whole.69 In contrast to the pirate, the sampler does not merely dupli-
cate the efforts of the sampled artist; the sampler, by using her creativ-
ity, has added something that makes the new song distinct from the
original.70
(2) Theft of Personality
Other commentators have argued that when the sampled sound is
clearly recognizable as having been created by another artist, the re-
sult is an appropriation of that artist's creative persona and an in-
fringement has occurred.71 This argument sounds both in the familiar
copyright notion of substantial similarity72 and in the element of un-
fair competition law termed the right of publicity.73
The doctrine of substantial similarity arose from a desire to re-
ward original expression.74 When a later work uses an earlier work as
a referent, but adds "nothing original to the world's store of literature,
69. What truly creative samplers do is akin to what visual artists do when they create
a collage. See Don Snowden, Sampling: A Creative Tool or License to Steal?, L.A. TMES,
Aug. 6, 1989, Calendar, at 61, 62; see also supra note 62.
70. See also Am, supra note 3, at 74; Wells, supra note 3, at 699. The fact that sam-
plers create a distinct work also defeats the argument that samplers cut into the sampled
artist's market for her recording, thus depriving the sampled artist of her profit. To illus-
trate the fallacy of this approach, if Gilbert O'Sullivan were to argue that Biz unfairly
infringed on the market of potential buyers of "Alone Again (Naturally)," then it would
follow that had he reissued the single, consumers would have purchased it at the same or a
similar rate as they bought Bit's album. No one could plausibly argue that buyers of Biz's
album would be likely to purchase O'Sullivan's single. If anything, Biz broadened
O'Sullivan's audience by introducing the song to an audience that would neither have
heard it nor would care to hear it. Biz must have added something to the sample to make
it attractive to consumers. This "added something" qualifies Biz's "Alone Again" as a
new, distinct work. See Sherri Carl Hampel, Note, Are Samplers Getting a Bum Rap?:
Copyright Infringement or Technological Creativity?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 559, 578-79
(1992).
71. See, e.g., Byram, supra note 3, at 384-85.
72. When a defendant has copied a substantial and material portion of the plaintiff's
work, the two works are said to be substantially similar. LEAFFER, supra note 67, § 9.5[A].
For a discussion of substantial similarity, see id. §§ 9.5-9.7. Substantial similarity has also
been addressed in several treatments of digital sampling issues. See, e.g., Albright, supra
note 5, at 82-87; Allen, supra note 3, at 190-92; Am, supra note 3, at 75-78; Giannini, supra
note 3, at 516-25; Small, supra note 3, at 95-96.
73. The right of publicity refers to the twin rights to prevent commercial use of one's
identity and to grant an exclusive privilege to use one's identity to a particular firm in a
defined market. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, Tim RIGHTS OF PuBLIcrrY AND PRIVACY § 1.7
(1989). For discussions of the right of publicity in a digital sampling context, see Allen,
supra note 3, at 195-96; Byram, supra note 3, at 374-89; McGiverin, supra note 3, at 1738-
45; Moglovkin, supra note 3, at 166-70; Small, supra note 3, at 109-11.
74. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGH. PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRAcncE § 2.2.1 (1989).
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music or art," the two works are said to be substantially similar to
each other, and the creator of the later work is deemed to have in-
fringed on the copyright of the creator of the earlier work.75
Substantial similarity simply does not apply to cases involving
music samplers. Music sampling is fundamental to rap music, and the
artistic value of rap music can scarcely be questioned. 76 To argue sub-
stantial similarity of a rap recording to the recordings from which its
samples come is to argue that rap music has no independent artistic
value.
Similarly, the right of publicity arises in a commercial context.
77
The right of publicity exists to prevent the improper use of another's
75. Id. § 7.1.2.
76. Perhaps the easiest way to demonstrate that rap music is on an artistic par with
rock, country and western, and other forms of popular music is to note that Grammy
Awards are given in the category of rap music as well as in each of these other genres.
Moreover, in Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir. 1992), a review of a
district court's declaratory judgment that the rap group 2 Live Crew's record As Nasty As
They Wanna Be was obscene, the Eleventh Circuit noted that expert testimony from music
critics and scholars validated the artistic and cultural merit of rap music and lyrics. Id. at
135-37.
77. The first case to recognize this right was Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). In Haelan Laborato-
ries, the plaintiff and the defendant were rivals in the manufacture of baseball cards. Plain-
tiff alleged in the suit that defendant lured away baseball players who had granted the
exclusive right to display their likenesses to plaintiff. Id. at 867. Defendant argued that the
only right a person has in his or her likeness is the right of privacy, which only covers hurt
feelings when a publication is made without the person's consent. Id. at 868. The court
held for plaintiff:
[A] man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph .... Whether it be
labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag
"property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecu-
niary worth....
[I]t is common knowledge that many prominent persons . . .would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popu-
larizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains
and subways.
Id.
Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reflected on what
he perceived as a rise in the assertion of rights to one's identity. In his dissenting opinion
in White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (order rejecting sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane), he states:
Private property, including intellectual property, is essential to our way of life. It
provides an incentive for investment and innovation; it stimulates the flourishing
of our culture; it protects the moral entitlements of people to the fruits of their
labors. But reducing too much to private property can be bad medicine....
... Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Crea-
tivity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing
since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came
before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to nurture.
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likeness or identity for advertising or commercial purposes. 78 Thus,
for example, a sample of "Alone Again (Naturally)" used in a beer
commercial would be a clear infringement of Gilbert's right to public-
ity. However, a rap recording is neither a commercial nor an
advertisement.
(3) Theft of Money
The argument that samplers somehow deprive the creators of the
sampled sounds of the fruits of their labors has several roots, all of
which sound in a judicially created affirmative defense to copyright
infringement-fair use. Leaffer characterizes fair use as "an equitable
rule of reason to be applied where a finding of infringement would
either be unfair or undermine 'the progress of science and the useful
arts."' 79 Three root arguments that sampling deprives the original art-
ist of something fall under the fair use concept. First, samplers get for
free what others have to buy-namely, the right to copy. Second,
samplers cut into the sampled artist's market by satisfying possible
demand for the original recording. Third, samplers can appropriate
distinctive, "signature sounds"80 without having to pay their creators.
The court completely glossed over the first argument-that sam-
plers get for free what others have to buy. As Grand Upright Music
was the first sampling case to be decided and the case was decided in
the absence of any statutory authority, the court created the right of
an artist to control samples of her work. Arguing that sampling in-
fringes upon a right assumes that the "samplee's" right to the sample
exists to begin with. The court should have first decided whether the
right of an artist to control samples of her work actually exists.
The second argument-that samplers cut into an artist's mar-
ket-focuses on the (ultimately chimerical) negatives, 81 while ignoring
the positives. As a number of commentators have pointed out, often a
sampled artist actually enjoys a renaissance of interest in her back cat-
Id. at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). These thoughts are applicable to intellectual property
rights outside the realm of publicity as well.
78. See McCARTHY, supra note 73, § 1.7.
79. LEAFEER, supra note 67, § 10.1. The four factors a court will take into account
when considering a defense of fair use are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. Id. § 10.6. The 1976 Copyright Act codified the doctrine at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). For discussions of possible fair use defenses by music samplers, see Al-
bright, supra note 5, at 90-92; Allen, supra note 3, at 197-98; Marcus, supra note 7, at 783-
85; McGiverin, supra note 3, at 1736-38; Note, supra note 7, at 736-39; Small, supra note 3,
at 101-03.
80. See Am, supra note 3, at 61.
81. See supra note 70.
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alog.82 Some artists have been rescued from obscurity by samples of
their work.83 Others have seen their careers improbably extended. 84
Still others have enjoyed an unexpected windfall when a sample con-
tributes to a surprise hit.85 These examples demonstrate that an art-
ist's market can actually be enlarged, rather than diminished, through
sampling.
In the early days of sampling, commentators focused heavily on
the third argument-the appropriation of signature sounds. Some
made dire predictions of the end of session musicians. After all, why
should one hire a union keyboardist when a sampler can do the work
for free?8 6 Ultimately such fears were unfounded.87
To illustrate the fallacy of such reasoning in the context of rap
music, one need only ask whether Biz would have considered hiring a
band to re-create the first eight bars of "Alone Again (Naturally)" if a
sample of the work were unavailable. One reason why samplers sam-
ple-in particular, why samplers sample from recognizable sources-
is that part of the fun of creating and listening to rap music is recog-
nizing and incorporating shared musical experiences. Much of the
pleasure of listening to Biz's "Alone Again" comes from recognizing
Gilbert O'Sullivan's "Alone Again (Naturally)" as the inspiration for
it. Biz expected people to make this connection. There is no better
82. See Hampel, supra note 70, at 579; David Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More":
Sampling and the "Autonomous" Creator, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REV. 607, 616
(1992).
83. Bobby Byrd, a relatively obscure soul singer primarily known for his association
with James Brown, had a minor hit called "I Know You Got Soul" in 1971. Following more
than a decade of inactivity, he was rediscovered and his career resuscitated when Eric B. &
Rakim built their identically titled song, released in 1987, around a Byrd sample. Byrd has
since toured Europe. Hampel, supra note 70, at 579.
84. While James Brown languished in prison, interest in his music was augmented by
(according to one estimate) over 2,000 songs featuring samples of various Brown record-
ings. Steve Garbarino, Culture Vulture, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1992, at 3. Somewhat ironi-
cally, Brown is against the practice of sampling. See Michael W. Miller, Creativity Furor
High-Tech Alteration of Sights and Sounds Divides the Art World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1,
1987, at 1, 25 (quoting Brown--"'[a]nything they take off my record is mine').
85. The most noteworthy example is the case of Suzanne Vega. She recorded her a
cappella "Tom's Diner" in 1987. Subsequently, the group DNA recorded its own backing
to the lyric. With Vega's blessing, DNA joined her vocals to its music; the result was a Top
Five hit in 1990. See Hampel, supra note 70, at 579 n.217.
86. See, e.g., Byram, supra note 3, at 366-68; McGiverin, supra note 3, at 1726-27;
McGraw, supra note 3, at 152; Jeffrey S. Newton, Note, Digital Sampling: The Copyright
Considerations of a New Technological Use of Musical Performance, 11 HASTINGS COMM.
& Err. L.J. 671, 674 nn.14-15 (1989); Wells, supra note 3, at 700.
87. To be sure, the commentators had in mind situations where, for instance, rather
than hiring a drummer, a sampler could simply sample a drumbeat and loop it, making it
sound over and over again. Even so, the advent of sophisticated keyboards and "drum
machines" largely renders the sampler a minor threat in the arena of machines replacing
people.
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way to provide the connection than by digital sampling, because sam-
pling allows exact duplication. Unless the reference to the target is
spot-on, note-for-note, the connection does not have the same impact.
Having studio musicians duplicate the eight bars would diminish the
impact to the point where Biz would have undoubtedly decided to
abandon the effort.
B. Gilbert O'Sullivan's Motive for Denying Permission
The cross-examination of Gilbert both nonplussed and exasper-
ated the court. To the judge, Gilbert's reasons for denying a license to
use the sample were irrelevant. In a sense, he was correct-nowhere
in the elements of a cause of action for copyright infringement lies the
requirement that the artist have a good reason for not allowing access
to her work.88 However, in light of the overarching justification for
copyright law, the case can be made that, without sufficient opportu-
nity to experience works of the past, the art of the future may be
stunted. 89 Rap illustrates this well-without samples, an important el-
ement of the genre of rap music would cease to exist.90
The Copyright andPatent Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that Congress may create copyrights in order "[t]o pro-
mote the progress of... [the] useful arts." 9' The Supreme Court
expressed the purpose of copyright by stating that "[t]he economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual ef-
fort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors."2 Rewarding the cre-
88. See LEA"FER, supra note 67, § 9.2.
89. It may be said in defense of copyrights that they eventually expire. Generally, in
the case of works created on or after January 1, 1978, the copyright lasts for the life of the
creator of the work, plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a
discussion of duration and renewal of copyrights, see NIMMER & NIMMVER, supra note 64,
§§ 9.01-9.07. Again, however, one may ask, does the benefit to the creator outweigh the
burden to the sampler and to society as a whole?
90. For a discussion of the essentiality of samples to rap, see Marcus, supra note 7, at
769-73.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
92. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp.
v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). This notion is at the foundation of the dominant theory
of copyright in the latter half of the twentieth century, the so-called "economic rationale"
theory. See LEAFFER, supra note 67, § 1.6. The economic rationale of copyright law re-
flects a tradeoff that society makes with artists: In order to allow artists to recoup their
intellectual investment in their work by compensating them for spending their otherwise
profitable time creating art, society grants them a limited monopoly for the products of
their efforts. See id.
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ators of artistic works is therefore only a "'secondary
consideration." 93
When a genre will rise or fall depending on the freedom to sam-
ple, the law should require a compelling reason as a threshold require-
ment for denying the right. Gilbert claimed that, although "Alone
Again (Naturally)" has been covered 94 hundreds of times, every cover
version was "faithfully sung" according to the spirit of Gilbert's ver-
sion,95 a standard that Biz's "Alone Again" evidently did not meet.
Gilbert had the legal right to withhold the license for this reason, but
if all artists held such beliefs about the sacredness of their works and
of particular interpretations of their works, the process of art creation
would be impermissibly impeded, and society would suffer as a re-
sult.96 The balance that copyright law tries to achieve between the
artist's right and society's benefit mandates that sampled artists should
be foreclosed from blocking rap music's continued existence.
C. Asking Before Sampling
In rendering the decision for plaintiff, the court was most im-
pressed with the fact that Biz had sought clearance from Gilbert
O'Sullivan before using the material on his album. To the court, this
was proof that a valid copyright existed.97 However, the real issue
presented was not whether Grand Upright Music held the copyright
to "Alone Again (Naturally)"; rather, the issue was whether the copy-
right of a song is infringed upon by a sample of that song. Moreover,
the court seems to have been completely unaware of the real reason
93. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948)); see also Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36
(1939) (stating that using copyright law to promote artistic works is of a lasting benefit to
the world).
94. To "cover" a song is to record a "cover version" of it. A "cover version" is an
artist's rendition of a song previously recorded by another artist. See Note, supra note 7, at
732. Once a record has been distributed, artists who wish to perform cover versions of
songs on the record may do so, provided only that they comply with statutory notice and
royalty requirements, see 17 U.S.C. § 115(b), (c), and that the cover "not change the basic
melody or fundamental character of the work," 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). This compulsory
license prevents an artist who originally recorded the song from blocking a subsequent
artist's cover-an acknowledgement that granting truly exclusive rights to copyright hold-
ers has the potential to inhibit the growth of future art. See also Note, supra note 7, at 732.
95. See Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 5.
96. As one commentator has remarked, "The most interesting areas of intellectual
property law tend to be just those places in which people are trying to hold on to their
creations against those who want the creation unfettered from its master." Justin Hughes,
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 294 (1988). Hughes cites the
example of a production of Samuel Beckett's Endgame by the Comedie-Frangaise in 1988.
Beckett was so upset by the acting company's interpretation of his work that he success-
fully halted the production. Id. at 295 n.27.
97. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 184.
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why Biz sought Gilbert O'Sullivan's permission. Because of the lack
of legal standards and the questionable status of sampling in general,
Biz was merely following a common industry practice of being safe
and cautious in the event that samples should be adjudged copyright
infringements in the future.98 By no means should the court have in-
terpreted this practice to imply that such an arrangement is
mandatory. The court's reasoning is illogical. Simply because the
statement "if P, then Q" is true (e.g., if a copyright exists, then a sam-
pler must seek clearance from the original artist), the converse state-
ment "if Q, then P" (e.g., if a sampler seeks clearance from the
original artist, then a copyright exists) does not necessarily follow.
Applying such illogic to the safe-sex maxim "if you are HIV-positive,
then you must use a condom," the court would reason that if a man
wore a condom, then he is HIV-positive. 99
D. Selling Too Many Records
In the court's estimation, greed was Biz's primary motivation for
infringing upon Gilbert O'Sullivan's copyright. Biz was not an artist
attempting to create "a whimsical, plaintive piece touching on the sub-
jects of loneliness, love and death"' 00; rather, Biz was an opportunist
trying to cash in at a real artist's expense. Instead of simply relying on
what it considered an unauthorized use, the court gratuitously in-
cluded a reference to the fact that Biz's records sell thousands of
copies.' 0'
There is a hint of elitism in this comment. The court implies that
the more popular an artist is, the less "worthy" her art is. This directly
contravenes a holding by the Supreme Court that courts are not to
judge artistic merit when deciding questions of copyrightability 02
98. See supra note 6; see also Broussard, supra note 53, at 479-80 (noting the music
industry's "ad hoc approach" to clearing samples).
99. An analogy to another affirmative defense to copyright infringement, parody, is
also instructive. The parodist does not need to get permission from the owner of the copy-
right to the object of the parody. Furthermore, an unsuccessful attempt to get permission
does not prejudice the defense. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432,437 (9th Cir. 1986). For a
discussion of parody in the context of sampling cases, see Hampel, supra note 70, at 570-72.
The Supreme Court has recently decided to answer the question whether 17 U.S.C.
§ 107, which codifies common-law fair use, encompasses parody as well. Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993) (granting certiorari).
100. This description of "Alone Again (Naturally)" appeared in plaintiff's post-hearing
memorandum. Sugarman & Salvo, supra note 12, at 5.
101. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185.
102. As Justice Holmes expressed it in 1903:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [works of art], outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repul-
sive until the public had learned the new language in which their author
January 1994]
The popularity of Biz's record should not have had any bearing on the
legality of his sample. It should not have even entered into the judg-
ment concerning Biz's motive for using the sample. After all, the goal
of "popular" musicians is to appeal to as many people as possible.
Why should an artist be penalized for achieving this goal? 10 3
I[V. A Possible Exit from the Dilemma?
At its heart, the dilemma that digital sound sampling creates is
the same problem that copyright law was designed to obviate. Copy-
right law balances the right of the artist to control access to her work
in order both to profit from her time and effort and to preserve the
integrity of her work, against the need for society to experience and
benefit from art. In the case of sampling, two interests clash: the de-
sire of the artist to capitalize on the market created by her works, and
the vitality of an art form that thrives on appropriating as much of
what preceded it as possible. Any solution to the issues that sampling
raises must take into account both sides.
A. Framing the Solution
By failing to grasp the issue in Grand Upright Music, the court
unwittingly created a bright-line rule in an area that needed standards
instead. The court assumed an answer to the very question it was sup-
posed to decide: Does a sampler need authorization to incorporate a
sample into her work? The judge must have wondered what the par-
ties were arguing about; there was not much to say once he decided
that point. This explains the paucity of cited authority.
Rather than start by assuming a sample was an infringement, the
judge should have posed the following questions: How extensive was
the sample? How long did it last? How recognizable was it? How
well was the sample incorporated into the song upon which it was
based? Would a reasonable person mistake the sample, or the work
incorporating the sample, for the source from which it was taken?
The court, instead, effectively rendered these questions moot by de-
ciding that all unauthorized samples are infringements.
spoke.... At the other end, copyright would be denied to [works] which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). Even ninety years
later, Justice Holmes' reference to "novelty" is eerily applicable. See also LEAFFER, supra
note 67, § 2.7[C] (discussing the requirement of originality as a prerequisite to
copyrightability).
103. It is worth noting that Gilbert O'Sullivan's "Alone Again (Naturally)" stayed at
Number One on the Billboard Pop chart for six weeks in 1972, eventually selling more than
five million copies worldwide. Barron, supra note 20. At the time of the decision in Grand
Upright Music, Biz's I Need a Haircut had sold fewer than 200,000 copies. See supra text
accompanying note 51.
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Not every digital sample should constitute an infringement upon
the sampled work. However, by the same token, some samples are so
reminiscent of the works they sample that they cease to be samples
and instead become clones. There exists a spectrum of sampling. At
one end resides the solitary James Brown shout, "dropped" once into
an eight-minute remix; at the other end are large-scale appropriations
such as Hammer's sample of Rick James' song "Super Freak" in his
song "U Can't Touch This."'1 4 The more insignificant the sample, the
less obligation should be placed on the sampler to compensate the
"samplee"; the more significant, the more the sampler should be
faulted if she does not take Hammer's attitude.
Most of the analytical tools used in copyright law to create the
necessary balance do not work well with sampling. Fair use has been
suggested as a candidate for an affirmative defense, but its very nature
makes its practical application difficult.10 5 A subgenre of fair use, par-
ody, has also been advanced; it is a poor fit, however, since there is
generally no element of lampooning in sampling. 106
Some commentators have advocated tort remedies to deal with
the profligate sampler. Unfair competition, 0 7 misappropriation, 08
and defamation'°9 have all been advanced as weapons to vindicate the
sampled artist's position. Where does this leave the sampler who just
wants to incorporate a distinctive sound into her next single? Not all
competition is unfair; not all appropriation is wrong; and not all sam-
ples defame.
104. "Right after I did the song, I said, 'Hey, I gotta pay Rick for this.' I didn't need a
lawyer to tell me that .... I'm borrowing enough of his song that he deserves to be
compensated." Hammer, quoted in Peter Castro, Chatter, PEOPLE, July 30, 1990, at 86.
105. Fair use's origins are equitable. Successful uses of it come through a case-by-case
basis. Furthermore, as Leaffer points out, its flexibility, while making it attractive, also
creates the impossibility of coherent elucidation of its principles. See LEAFFER, supra note
67, § 10.2. For a proposal that incorporates congressional standards rather than judicial
standards, see infra Part IV.B.
106. For an argument that sampling and parody should be treated identically, see Ham-
pel, supra note 70, at 579-83.
107. Both common-law and federal statutory causes of action have been advanced-
the latter under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), which pro-
hibits "the false representation of authorship." See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 193-95; E.
Scott Johnson, Protecting Distinctive Sounds: The Challenge of Digital Sampling, 2 J.L. &
TEcH. 273, 296-99 (1987); Moglovkin, supra note 3, at 162-66; Small, supra note 3, at 105-
09.
108. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 195-96; Am, supra note 3, at 83-86; Moglovkin,
supra note 3, at 165-66.
109. See Allen, supra note 3, at 196-97; Johnson, supra note 107, at 300-02.
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B. A Proposal
The following proposed statute is patterned after 17 U.S.C. § 107,
which establishes the affirmative defense of fair use. Fair use com-
bines delineated standards with flexibility and discretion, allowing
principled decision making without the rigidity of bright-line rules. 110
Similarly, this sampling statute will enable judges to rule in accord-
ance with democratically established principles that reflect the bal-
ance between artists' rights and samplers' rights.
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-106A, the
sampling of a copyrighted work for artistic purposes is not an in-
fringement of copyright.
(b) For purposes of this section, "sampling" is defined as using a
machine to convert analog sound waves into a digital code, in order
to:
(1) incorporate the resulting code into an original musical
composition;
(2) combine resulting codes taken from one or multiple sources to
create an original musical composition; or
(3) manipulate the resulting code for the purposes of (1) or (2).111
(c) In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a sample, factors to be considered shall include the following:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is for purely commercial purposes or for artistic purposes;
(2) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(3) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
This statute represents a step forward from fair use. First, it
clearly states that sampling is an art form, meriting legal recognition
only insofar as it contributes to the creation of a work of art. Second,
it codifies a definition of sampling, giving judges a reference point for
discussion of this threshold issue. Third, it provides a list of things for
judges to take into account when deciding the merits of particular
sampling cases. Subsection (c), while taken verbatim from 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(1), (3), and (4), can be interpreted purely in light of sampling
issues. Paragraph (1) distinguishes between purely commercial uses
of samples, such as television or radio advertisements, and uses in ar-
tistic endeavors, like rap songs. Paragraph (2) allows judges to con-
sider the "spectrum" of samples. 112 Paragraph (3) protects artists who
fear that samples of their creation will shrink their market.
Congressional action that will enable every sampler to know
where she stands in deciding whether to sample is sorely needed.
110. See supra Part IV.A.
111. See supra note 1.
112. See supra Part IV.A.
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Clearly, the problems created by sampling are great, and the stakes
are high.
Conclusion
Given an opportunity to provide judicial guidance, the court in
Grand Upright Music failed to do so. Thus, digital sound sampling
continues to cause controversy. Samplers and sampled artists alike
operate in legal limbo, neither sure where they stand. In this way,
copyright law acts counter to its reason for existence: to protect the
creation of art for the benefit of artists and society both.
The court misapprehended the issues, but in so doing, it focused
attention on them. Congress can now step in and create guidelines to
accommodate the needs and wishes of samplers and the sampled. The
future for samplers and "samplees" alike can be bright, a nascent
genre can survive, and music lovers can be better for it.

